Reading Christopher
Hitchen’s Trial of Henry Kissinger prompted
me, somewhat indirectly, to do two things: finally get round to watching the
film Balibo, and do an internet search
for articles on former president of Indonesia Suharto by my favourite foreign
affairs writer, the Australian’s Greg
Sheridan. Both actions were a response to Hitchen’s damning analysis of
Kissinger’s role in, and feigned ignorance of, the Indonesian invasion of East
Timor in 1975. Suharto went to his grave denying that five Australian
journalists were executed by Special Force soldiers at Balibo during the
invasion on 16 October 1975. The official government line in Indonesia (where
Robert Connolly’s meticulously-made film is banned) remains that the
journalists were killed in crossfire. This claim has been utterly discredited,
not least of all by an Australian coroner in 2007, and author Jill Jolliffe, on
whose book Cover-Up Connolly’s film
was based.
There is no mention of the ‘Balibo
Five’ in Sheridan’s most galling paean to Suharto, published, on the occasion
of the despot’s death, on the Aus's blog in
January 2008. Suharto is, for Sheridan, ‘Jakarta’s man of steel’, a great
reformer who rescued his country from communism and starvation. He approvingly
quotes Paul Keating, who contended that Suharto’s presidency was one of the
most important strategic developments for Australia in recent times. It is true
to say that Suharto’s reign was, in many ways, fruitful for the West; his
government accepted World Bank and IMF ‘reforms’, opened up Indonesia’s economy
through divestment, and encouraged international investment in mining and
construction. (The idea, however, that Australia should be thankful to Suharto
for staunching communism in the region and thus preventing a huge increase in
defence spending is pure speculation which might have washed in the days of the
Cold War but seems more than a little daft now. Communist influence in
Indonesia, in any case, was greatly overstated by the Suharto regime in its
early days in order to strengthen its position).
One of the odder features of all
this toadying is the mysterious disclaimer (made after such flatteries as
the reproduction of Tim Fischer’s idea that Suharto was ‘the man of the 20th
century’) that: ‘It is hard to take the proper measure of Suharto.’ Really,
Greg? You seem to have made a pretty good fist of it. He was – wasn’t he? – a
‘man of steel’, ‘important’, a stabiliser, a reformer, a vital player in APEC,
‘a prime mover of history whose rule was of immeasurable benefit to Australia.’
In fact, you can scarcely bring yourself to say a bad word about this man and,
when you do, it is with such reluctance and so much qualification as to render
the criticism virtually stillborn. That the chief foreign affairs commentator
at the country’s most influential broadsheet was allowed to get away with such
unmitigated garbage may have been breathtaking in an era before the News
Limited phone hacking scandal, but now it just seems like a sad, inevitably
obnoxious chapter in the death throes of an ethically and intellectually
bankrupt media empire.
Sheridan
tells us that: ‘Although Indonesia was never a democracy under Suharto, there was a wide
degree of permissible discussion, by Southeast Asian standards a fairly liberal
press, and many of the procedures of social consultation that characterise a
democracy.’ The reality? Indonesia under Suharto was effectively a
dictatorship, with many more features characteristic of totalitarianism than of
a democracy. Suharto’s government was dominated by the military, and during his
leadership 100 seats were set aside for military representatives in the
electoral college. Suharto was elected as president, unopposed, six times
between 1973 and 1998. The true force for democracy in Indonesia – the
Indonesian Democratic Party – was never allowed to be a viable opposition.
Suharto’s opponents were repressed and crushed under his ‘New Order’ by two
intelligence agencies, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security
and Order, and the State Intelligence Coordination Agency. Student protests
were banned in 1970. Under Suharto’s rule, the Chinese in Indonesia were
ruthlessly oppressed through the closing of schools and newspapers and the
banning of Chinese script in public. Chinese-Indonesians were advised to adopt
Indonesian-sounding names. They were not permitted to practice religion outside
of their homes.
Suharto’s
exceptional contempt for democracy is seemingly not worthy of comment by
Sheridan whose denialist revisionism deepens as he goes on to ‘address’, with
offensive brevity, the East Timor invasion. During the invasion (which was
condemned by the United Nations but largely and unforgivably tolerated by the
West) somewhere in the region of 20,000 people were killed (about 70% by
Indonesian forces). Anywhere between 70,000 and 190,000 more died from hunger
or illness as a result. The magnitude of these death tolls is simply staggering.
Noam Chomsky argued that the invasion represented the worst case of genocide
relative to population since the Holocaust.
Sheridan
has more to say about the anti-communist killings of 1965 (from which he sees
fit to largely exonerate the Indonesian military) than about East Timor. He
devotes just one sentence to it, dismissing the genocidal invasion as a human
rights ‘excess’, a mere ‘flaw’ of Suharto’s rule.
We are
told that Suharto’s ‘negatives’ were ‘huge and undeniable’ but denial is what
Sheridan is best at, and what he practices with regards to Indonesia with
Olympian aptitude. He cannot bring himself – in what is a characteristic
failing of the right – to invoke death counts which surely are imperative
pieces of information in human rights violations of this scale. The only
occasion on which Sheridan uses numbers is to talk up Suharto’s achievements in
freeing ‘millions of people’ from poverty. No figures, either, are given to
illuminate the widespread corruption and embezzlement which ran through both
Suharto’s government and family like a vein (for the record, and as only one
example, it has been alleged that somewhere between 15 and 30 billion dollars
US was ‘misappropriated’ during Suharto’s presidency).
Sheridan’s
final word on the subject? ‘There was good and bad in Suharto, good and bad in
what he did.’ I’d like to know which world leader, present or past, could not
be summed up in such a trivial and pointless way. Deeds, not words, Hitchens
believed, speak the loudest. This is how history, and its authors, ought to
judge Suharto. Sheridan’s mealy-mouthed tribute to a blood-soaked tyrant is an
insult to Suharto’s millions of victims, both in Indonesia and East Timor. It
is an affront to the Australian journalists murdered at Balibo. It is a
pitilessly one-eyed distortion of history which serves only to demonstrate the
ideological biases of the author and his newspaper. Suharto, as far as Sheridan
is concerned, was not a monster because he was not a communist. Stalin was a
monster, because he was. History will not be kind to Suharto, just as it has
not been kind to Stalin and the appalling crimes committed under communism in
the 20th century. Nor will history be kind to Greg Sheridan, and his
abhorrent whitewashing of history in the Australasian region.
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